The scholarly literature on health care politics has generated a series of hypotheses to explain U.S. exceptionalism in health policy and to explain the adoption of national health insurance (NHI) more generally. Various cultural, institutional, and political conditions are held to make the establishment of some form of national health insurance policy more (or less) likely to occur. The literature is dominated by national and comparative case studies that illustrate the theoretical logic of these hypotheses but do not provide a framework for examining the hypotheses cross-nationally. This article is an initial attempt to address that void by using Boolean analysis to examine systematically several of the major propositions that emerge from the case study literature on the larger universe of twenty advanced industrial democracies. This comparative analysis offers considerable support for the veto points hypothesis while still finding each of the factors examined to be relevant in certain scenarios. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for future research and for advocates of national health insurance in the United States.
The United States is one of the few advanced industrial democracies without some form of national health insurance. This oft-heard empirical observation readily emerges from a cross-national consideration of health policy. Advocates of national health insurance in the United States often point out the exceptional nature of U.S. health policy in attempts to pressure policy makers to shift to what Joseph White (1995a) has termed "the international standard." Health policy debate raises a clear research question: Why have attempts to foster national health insurance failed in the United States when they have succeeded in almost all other industrial democracies?
This straightforward formulation of a cross-national research problem seems so obvious that it almost defies comment. However, in the public and scholarly debate over health policy dynamics in the United States, one searches in vain for an analysis that encompasses all (or even most) advanced industrial democracies. There are scores of case studies on the U.S. experience, and there are many case studies of other countries' respective health policy dynamics. There are several comparative case studies of health policy decisions in two to four countries. While there are a few efforts to describe multiple countries' health policies, these do not focus on the dynamics of the decision to adopt national health insurance. Here, we work to bridge that gap by studying health policy dynamics in twenty advanced industrial democracies of the postwar era.
We firmly believe that the richness of the existing case study literature deepens our understanding of health policy dynamics in ways that a cross-national analysis of twenty countries cannot. However, the converse is equally true: a comparative view that is truly comprehensive can shed new light on old issues and/or raise new concerns. Much of the existing scholarly debate is focused on highlighting the importance of a single set of factors in explaining the absence of national health insurance in the United States. Some say that an individualistic culture blocks NHI. Others believe that U.S. governmental institutions are the primary obstacle to major reform. Still others counter that powerful interest groups thwart NHI in the absence of a major, disciplined political party in support. All participants in this debate can wield illustrative evidence to make their claims plausible. When these claims are subjected to a comprehensively cross-national analysis, which ones hold up?
We begin with a review of the existing explanations for the failure of national health insurance in the United States. We then mold those major explanations into a causal model that can be investigated cross-nationally. That comparative analysis is conducted using techniques based on Boolean algebra. We have chosen these techniques because of numerical problems that plague quantitative analysis but also because the case-oriented nature of the Boolean approach is more congruent with the existing literature on health policy dynamics. As we shall see, such comparative analysis finds considerable support for the veto points hypothesis while still finding each of the factors examined to be relevant in certain scenarios. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for future research and for advocates of national health insurance in the United States.
Literature Review
Why has the United States failed to adopt national health insurance? We supplement a review of the literature on U.S. health policy dynamics with research on the cross-national emergence of the welfare state more generally. The comparative work on the welfare state is useful in building a comparative model of NHI adoption because there is a much larger cross-national literature on the adoption of welfare state policies as a whole than exists for health policy dynamics. This review yields four major sets of potential explanations: cultural, economic, institutional, and political.
Cultural Explanations
Perhaps one of the most widely discussed obstacles to the emergence of a national health insurance in the United States is its individualistic and antigovernment culture (Anderson 1972; Jacobs 1993a; Rimlinger 1971; Patel and Rushefsky 1995; Starr 1982; White 1995b) . The United States is widely considered to be the advanced industrial democracy where classical liberalism has had the most visible and enduring influence on public policy. Citizens' ideas about the proper scope of government authority -that is, their belief in limited government -and their commitment to distinct public and private spheres are argued to reduce support for universal entitlement programs. Consequently, NHI has not been adopted in the United States because many citizens want individuals held responsible for their own insurance, and more still do not trust government to provide NHI.
Mollyann Brodie and Robert Blendon (1995) provide a nuanced version of the cultural argument in analyzing the failure to enact NHI during the first Clinton administration. Public opinion called for major, if not sweeping, health care reform but fell short of asking for national health insurance. The public's mixed messages on comprehensive health care reform ultimately produced congressional gridlock and the failure to adopt NHI. Others making the attitudinal argument see fundamentally differing views on public and private responsibilities between policy makers and citizens, which, when combined with a traditional reluctance to engage in comprehensive reform, accounted for the failure to pass NHI (Smith 1995) . Similarly, Lawrence Jacobs (1993b) argues that although Americans may favor the security that NHI offers, their endur-ing uneasiness toward government and their dislike of bureaucracy continue to pose a significant obstacle to reform.
Critics of the cultural explanation counter either by focusing on opinion polls that indicate a high percentage of the population in support of health care reform (Peterson 1993a; Schlesinger and Lee 1993) or by citing specific polls in which many or most citizens seem to support NHI itself (Navarro 1994) . Others argue that preexisting public uncertainty about NHI did not drive public policy in the last round of reform; instead, uncertainty emerged as congressional NHI opponents and like-minded interest groups sought to create fears about "big government" and waste. Thus it is policy makers and interest groups, not the public, who deserve the blame for the most recent failure to adopt NHI (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995; Koch 1998) . It must be noted, however, that many of those who point out the existence of public support for NHI also note that there are fissures in public opinion in the United States. At the end of the day, citizens in the United States still prefer a limited governmental role, and this preference can be exploited by those seeking to prevent change (Hacker 1996; Morone 1995; Rockman 1995) .
From a comparative perspective, the crucial issue would seem not to be about polling data in support of NHI but rather efforts to measure the individualistic nature of the society more generally. Various studies of the emergence and development of the welfare state in advanced industrial democracies note that the liberal tradition of individualism had deeper roots and more political impact in the Anglo-American countries than in other advanced industrial democracies. This cultural obstacle of a strongly liberal tradition is said to have slowed the initiation of major welfare policies (Flora and Alber 1982) ; to have lowered transfer spending levels (Castles 1982) ; and to have created distinctive welfare policies (Esping-Anderson 1990) in the Anglo-American countries. 1 The logic of this deeper cultural explanation is that individualism simultaneously reinforces both a reluctance to provide government programs for ablebodied working citizens and, just as important, a distrust of government solutions to societal problems. Returning from this comparative view to the study of the United States, this country is often said to be the most individualistic of the Anglo-American countries (King 1973) .
Economic Explanations
In the study of U.S. health policy dynamics, it is fair to say that economic explanations based on the nature or timing of economic development have not played a major role. Perhaps the closest thing to any form of economic explanation is the role that existing health insurance coverage plays in the debate in the United States. While advocates of NHI cite the millions of people without health insurance, some analysts note that one obstacle for reformers is the simple fact that a substantial majority of the population either has employer-provided health insurance or enough income to purchase health insurance (Stone 1993) .
In the broader cross-national literature on the emergence of the welfare state, economic explanations have been much more visible. The "convergence thesis" (Wilensky 1975) argues that as countries become advanced industrial democracies (normally measured by gross domestic product per capita) they are likely to experience similar social and political pressures that culminate in the adoption of a wide range of comparable welfare policies -in part because those greater economic resources provide greater "breathing room" for the expansion of government spending and activity. Evidence can be presented to demonstrate the relevance of the convergence thesis for explaining the timing of welfare policy initiation and the level of welfare spending across a wide variety of countries around the world (Flora and Alber 1982) . Milton Roemer applied this approach to account for the expansion of government spending on health care throughout the industrialized world in the postwar era. It has been less useful, however, for explaining differences among the wealthy countries. This problem seems particularly acute when one examines the adoption of NHI. Simply put, it is hard to assert that a lack of economic resources blocks the adoption of NHI in the United States, as it has been one of the world's wealthiest countries during the postwar era in which other advanced industrial democracies adopted comprehensive NHI policies.
Institutional Explanations
A more recent set of explanations centers on institutional obstacles to the adoption of NHI in the United States. Sven Steinmo and Jon Watts (1995:330) succinctly summarize the core of this explanation, "This institutional bias begins with a political structure forged by America's founding fathers that was explicitly designed to pit faction against faction to protect minority factions from majority factions." Their study illustrates the role played by U.S. institutions -for example, federalism, pluralism, presidentialism, and the separation of powers -in shaping the failure to adopt NHI in a variety of situations across the twentieth century. Morone (1995) also makes an institutional argument about the most recent failure to adopt NHI, concluding that American politics is so disorganized and prone to stalemate that comprehensive reform is nearly impossible. The characteristics of the American party and electoral systems also reduce the possibilities for reform by making it more difficult for third parties, particularly left-wing parties that are more likely to favor NHI, to emerge and thrive (Maioni 1997) .
This institutionalist form of explanation builds on broad cross-national literature that explores the relevance of institutional distinctions for welfare state policies and, indeed, for government decision making more generally. Several cross-national studies of the evolution of the welfare state note that federal states have tended to have lower levels of welfare spending than unitary states (Cameron 1978; Wilensky 1975) . The logic of this explanation is that federalism's mix of responsibilities provides more opportunities for opponents of welfare spending to intervene in the political process and, in turn, to slow the growth of the welfare state. In considering this literature, one should note that while many federal states among the advanced industrial democracies have large populations and/or territories, this pattern holds for smaller federal countries and when one controls for population size (e.g., Switzerland).
Another specific, often-discussed institutional obstacle to sweeping policy change is the nature of presidential executive-legislative relations (Burns 1963; Robinson 1985; Sundquist 1992; Wilson 1987) . R. Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman (1993a: 11) provide a useful summary of the advantages for major policy enactment said to be provided by parliamentary executives: "Parliamentary systems [feature] stronger party discipline, greater recruitment of ministers from the legislature, greater centralization of legislative authority in the cabinet, and greater centralization of accountability." 2 These are precisely the sorts of institutional issues emphasized by Steinmo and Watts in their 1995 study of the fail-684 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 2. One should note that this excerpt from Weaver and Rockman is taken from the framing introductory chapter to their edited volume on the relevance of executive-legislative distinctions for a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues in advanced industrial democracies. Near the close of that same volume, Weaver and Rockman conclude that the relationship between parliamentary and presidential systems and policy making has proved more contingent on other factors than its straightforward presentation would imply (1993c).
ure of NHI in the United States in the twentieth century. 3 Mark A. Peterson (1993a Peterson ( , 1993b counters that changes in U.S. legislative practices reduced institutional obstacles to NHI in the 1990s.
Many critics of the institutional perspective express dissatisfaction with an explanation of policy dynamics as narrowly cast as Steinmo and Watts's argument. Joan Sokolovsky (1998) does not reject the institutionalists' views as inaccurate, but claims that they overemphasize the effects of structural constraints to the exclusion of all other variables. While institutions no doubt create the parameters for the policy-making process, there is danger in any analytical perspective that is overly deterministic. Institutions do indeed create a particular policy-making context, but conflict and struggle among political actors will still have a significant effect on outcomes.
Focusing on countries other than the United States, Ellen Immergut (1992) analyzed the evolution of health policy in France, Sweden, and Switzerland. Immergut's analysis unified the federalist and presidential obstacles under the concept of veto points, which she defines as follows: "Thus, once executive governments decide to propose legislation, a critical question is whether politicians or voters in other parts of the system can veto the executive decision. If so, interest groups with access to these votes will be able to demand changes in the legislation or to block it entirely" (227 -228). This conceptualization permits one to consider the precise behavioral nature of executive-legislative relations and not simply the parliamentary-presidentialism dichotomy. Although Immergut stresses the role of institutional factors in preventing a straight line from the positions of parties and groups to policymaking, she concludes her study with a call to remain open to a variety of influences (242 -244).
Political Explanations
A fourth set of explanations for the absence of NHI in the United States focuses on the roles played by political parties and interest groups in health policy formation and adoption. One set of political explanations focuses on the positions of the major political parties. Simply put, neither Blake and Adolino s Health Care Policy in Advanced Industrial Countries 685 3. Baumgartner and Talbert (1995) stress a third, more specific, institutionalist argument in their analysis of the failure of health care reform in the first Clinton administration. They note that the legislative process in the United States during the years 1980 -1991 saw many more congressional committees fighting for jurisdiction over health policy than for other major policy issues as well as a lower percentage of total hearings held by the dominant health policy committees.
of the major parties in the United States has taken a position wholeheartedly in support of NHI. This is made clear in both sweeping chronological narratives (Steinmo and Watts 1995) and in studies focusing on the last round of major debate in the early 1990s. David Brady and Kara Buckley's research (1995) details the difficulties the Clinton proposal for NHI faced not just with Republican moderates but also with many within the president's own party; they conclude that only a reform short of NHI was remotely feasible and even that was fraught with peril in the Senate. The Clinton administration's failure to pitch reform directly at the median congressional voter on both sides led to the failure to adopt NHI.
When one steps back to consider the role played by political parties from a broader cross-national perspective in the welfare state literature, the issue is framed in a manner unthinkable in studies of the United States alone. Leftist political parties played an important role in stimulating the emergence and evolution of the welfare state in most advanced industrial democracies while rightist parties worked to slow its development (Castles 1982) . Manfred Schmidt (1982) demonstrated that leftist prime ministers were visibly associated with the expansion of the public revenues in the years 1950 -1975 . In contrast, the few countries without powerful leftist parties manifested the slowest growth in government and in welfare spending -Canada and the United States, for example. The leftist party argument is applied directly to decisions about NHI by Vicente Navarro (1989 Navarro ( , 1995 and Antonia Maioni (1997) . They maintain that the absence of a social democratic, socialist, or labor party in the United States means that the left and the working class must look to the more moderate Democratic Party to voice their concerns in both the electoral and legislative arenas, which in turn significantly reduces the likelihood of adopting NHI in the future.
Other studies have emphasized the role played by special interest groups opposed to NHI in blocking its emergence (Alford 1975; Baumgartner and Talbert 1995; Navarro 1976; Rushefsky and Patel 1998; Patel and Rushefsky 1995; Poen 1979; Starr 1982) . In successive reform attempts in the twentieth century, the fierce opposition of stakeholders in the existing system (especially the insurance companies and medical associations) blocked change -either by keeping reform proposals from reaching the policy agenda or by blocking their adoption once they achieved agenda status. One should note that this interest group explanation of U.S. dynamics has recently come under challenge as new studies argue that the nearly monolithic opposition of years past has given way to a more complex environment in which elements of the insurance industry, medical associations, and the business community more generally are now more supportive of major health care reform (Mueller 1993; Peterson 1993a Peterson , 1993b . A cross-national challenge to this explanation is the observation that the stakeholders of the status quo bitterly opposed NHI's adoption in most advanced industrial democracies, and yet NHI often triumphed despite the opposition (Anderson 1972; Eckstein 1960; Heidenheimer 1980; Immergut 1992; Klein 1983; Wilsford 1990) .
The uneven success of interest group stakeholders in blocking NHI points to a need to model the nature of interest group politics. Pluralist analyses of interest group politics note that the multiplicity of groups and their relatively unstructured access to government officials tends to make any major policy reform difficult. Conversely, in a corporatist setting, the greater centralization and more hierarchical nature of interest groups can reduce the tendency toward incrementalism associated with pluralism (Schmitter 1979) . In addition, the more institutionalized relationships between peak interest associations and government provide fewer veto points in the interest group milieu. In other words, the dimension of pluralism to corporatism in societal organization is akin to the federal-unitary dimension of state organization: one side of each spectrum provides fewer veto points than the other.
Building a Causal Model That Travels Cross-Nationally
As we noted at the outset, the debate over the dynamics of health policy decisions has been dominated by national case studies supplemented by a few comparative case studies. All of these efforts use a narrative approach to explore explanations for a lack of a national health insurance program in the United States. Our task in this article is to formulate hypotheses (reflective of the explanations in past studies) that can be investigated across twenty advanced industrial democracies in the postwar era. In this section we explain why we picked these particular twenty countries and that time period. We then proceed to formulate hypotheses that can be investigated across those countries in the years 1945 -1994.
Case Selection
This time period was chosen to encompass the period in which advanced industrial democracies adopted truly nationwide health insurance pro-grams. Although several countries established health insurance policies prior to World War II, the decision to adopt a policy that offered some form of government-sponsored or mandated insurance to all citizens came in the postwar era. 4 We close the examination at 1994 to encompass the time period in which the last major effort to establish NHI in the United States took place.
Country cases were chosen first and foremost to screen out the economic development explanation (which is certainly irrelevant for the United States and would seem largely irrelevant within the world of advanced industrial democracies). 5 Accordingly, only advanced industrial economies will be examined. In turn, the desire to check for the influence of competing democratic political institutions and the influence of electoral politics ruled out a series of contemporary advanced industrial countries that were not democracies during appreciable portions of the years 1945 -1994. This decision excluded Greece, Portugal, South Korea, and Spain from the analysis. These two criteria taken together leave us with twenty countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (the Federal Republic of ) Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Hypotheses under Investigation
It is not always an easy proposition to formulate hypotheses that can be investigated in twenty countries over nearly a fifty-year period. However, the explanations of NHI adoption (and failure) are largely structural in nature. As a result, these independent variables are not as time sensitive 4. While the initiation date of the first partial NHI legislation is decidedly relevant to studies on the expansion of the welfare state into new areas of activity, it is not an appropriate criterion for framing an examination of our research question (i.e., why has the United States failed to adopt NHI when other advanced industrial democracies have done so?). If we were to date the adoption of NHI as the enactment of the first legislation to provide insurance to some portion of the national population, our question would cease to exist because the U.S. Medicare program has provided insurance to senior citizens for more than thirty years now.
5. Jacobs (1995) makes a stimulating argument that economic factors -particularly the rising costs of health care (relative to most other goods and services) and the economic power of interests entrenched in the current system -created additional obstacles to the enactment of NHI in the United States under the Clinton administration. This observation raises the hypothesis that it would have been easier to adopt NHI before the shift in relative prices and the growth of the private health providers. While we concur that these factors are relevant to understanding the dynamics of the contemporary era, the argument itself notes that these economic obstacles were not fully in place in the prior decades, during which the vast majority of industrial democracies adopted NHI. In short, this explanatory variable does not travel well cross-nationally despite its clear relevance for the contemporary analysis of U.S. health care politics.
as they might be. Culture is an enduring set of values and not so much a reaction to any particular policy proposal. 6 The economic explanation based on national wealth is structural (even though here we have controlled for it via case selection by studying only wealthy countries). The institutional explanations are clearly structural. The only set of explanations that has a potentially less enduring nature is political. Party fortunes can rise and fall; a casual glimpse at the record shows that only a few of these twenty countries were governed primarily by one party throughout most of this time period. 7 By the same token, the visibility, resources, and political influence of individual interest groups can also rise and fall over time. Even here, however, it is possible to conceptualize the role of party politics and interest groups in a less time-sensitive manner; below we will take just such an approach in developing a partisanship variable that captures the influence of leftist parties in each country's politics and interest group variable that focuses on the overall nature of interest group politics.
An individualistic culture was said to play a role in blocking the adoption of NHI in the United States (and in delaying its adoption elsewhere, as in Australia and Canada). Societies with deeply rooted individualism are said to be more reluctant to embrace NHI because citizens are more likely to hold individuals responsible for providing insurance or are more likely to be skeptical about the effectiveness of government intervention. The role of an individualistic culture as an obstacle to the adoption of NHI will be defined in this study by coding all Anglo-American countries as having more individualistic cultures than the rest of their counterparts in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This decision has been made based on earlier studies on the welfare state that stress the individualistic nature of Anglo-American nations as an obstacle for the expansion of welfare policies and of government activity more generally (Esping-Anderson 1990; King 1973) .
We considered the possibility of operationalizing an individualistic culture using public opinion data. The principal problem with that mea-6. As we noted in the literature review, many cultural explanations of the failure of NHI in the United States have focused on public opinion surveys about NHI -as have varied efforts to rebut those studies. Nevertheless, the core of the cultural explanation is that public reticence has its roots in more deeply held values about individual freedom, individual responsibility, and the appropriate scope of government.
7. Japan stands out as the primary example of near one-party dominance over the years under examination. Sweden experienced a long period of uninterrupted Social Democratic rule that encompassed nearly half of this period while, in Italy, the Christian Democratic Party was at the center of power in a variety of coalition governments for almost the entire period. surement approach is that the lengthy time period under analysis and the specific questions asked can each conceivably skew the measurement results. Since this study is framed around a broad time span, one would want to average polling results across time and across countries to an identical question. Not only are no identical questions available, no crossnationally comparable questions cover enough of the time period at issue to enable this measurement approach to work. In contrast, framing the measure around an Anglo-American tradition captures a variety of deeper cultural traditions and values that are less subject to variation across the years 1945-1994. The specific cultural hypothesis under examination is:
The lack of an Anglo-American heritage improves the political feasibility of NHI.
Unitary states' centralization of power is said to aid the emergence of NHI by limiting the number of decision points at which opponents can block its adoption. The institutional explanation based on the federal/ unitary distinction provides a much more straightforward measurement decision. Countries held to have unitary states will be coded as such; federal and semifederal states will not. The specific institutional hypothesis under investigation is: The presence of a unitary state improves the political feasibility of NHI.
The other major institutional explanation discussed earlier revolved around executive-legislative relations. Specifically, parliamentary executives were said to clear the path to NHI by stimulating more disciplined political parties and by centralizing authority in the executive. Both of these trends limit decision points -thereby reducing the chances that opponents of NHI can stop its enactment once major governmental leaders decide to pursue NHI. To capture this issue of decision points and executive authority, we will not simply code all parliamentary systems as favorable and all presidential and semipresidential systems as unfavorable. Instead, we will employ a behavioral measure of executive branch dominance that reflects both the parliamentary-presidential divide and the relative ability of parliamentary governments to remain in power. The hypothesis under investigation is: The presence of a dominant executive improves the political feasibility of NHI.
The political explanations discussed in the literature center on the nature of political parties' positions and interest group activity. Regarding parties, here we choose to focus on leftist parties because of their support for NHI across countries and because of their centrality to comparative studies of other policy areas (particularly regarding the emergence and expansion of the welfare state). Leftist parties with significant support thrust NHI onto the public agenda in addition to increasing its chances of adoption by gaining control of the central government. Here we form a working definition that bridges those two dynamics by coding all countries with a leftist party capable of capturing the chief executive in more than one instance over more than one decade as having political conditions favorable for the adoption of NHI. The hypothesis under investigation is: The presence of a relevant leftist party improves the political feasibility of NHI.
As for interest group politics, we noted earlier that the assertion that powerful stakeholders in the status quo block the emergence of NHI in the United States is difficult to examine cross-nationally because in all countries most insurers, many or most physicians, and the most vigorously market-oriented business associations opposed the adoption of NHI. It is difficult to measure in a meaningful way distinctions in the degree of opposition across twenty countries. It is similarly difficult to measure differences in the strategies that interest groups use in persuading elected officials to take a strong position regarding the adoption of NHI. As a result of these doubts about the empirical support for the interest group strategy variable (as well as serious challenges to its valid and reliable measurement), we have chosen to focus on the pattern of interest group interaction rather than on interest group strategy. Pluralist interest group dynamics are seen as an obstacle to NHI because they make any sweeping policy change more difficult. Conversely, corporatist patterns of interest group activity reduce the number of decision obstacles by reducing the number and heterogeneity of players at the table. The hypothesis under investigation is: The presence of a corporatist pattern of interest group activity improves the political feasibility of NHI.
The Boolean Analysis
The major reason for the absence of comprehensive cross-national studies of the dynamics of national health insurance in advanced industrial democracies is that such a study faces some methodological obstacles. Perhaps the principal hurdle is posed by the limited number of cases under observation. Once one decides to frame the research question around the wealthy democracies, the number of cases to study is low; the familiar "small-N" problem rears its head. Furthermore, the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable exacerbates the small-N concerns because more robust regression techniques designed for continuous dependent variables are not an option. In turn, the traditional methods used in their place (logit, probit, and logistic regression) are based on problematic assumptions. To take advantage of the asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators, N is assumed to be fairly large. 8 We arrive at a troubling methodological hurdle that blocks the use of quantitative approaches frequently used in cross-national studies of public policy dynamics in advanced industrial democracies.
Techniques based on Boolean algebra provide one means of resolving the small-N problem posed here. Boolean analysis involves describing the empirical relationships among dichotomous variables in a truth table and then using Boolean algebra to express those relationships in a more parsimonious fashion. 9 Boolean analysis in social science -which has been alternatively dubbed qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)-increasingly has been used in cross-national studies of a single outcome in time (Ragin 1994) . That is precisely the sort of research question we confront here.
The QCA approach is not without some potential problems. One major potential hazard with QCA stems from the conversion of continuous variables into dichotomous ones. The researcher must assume that the relationship between the once-continuous independent variable and the dependent variable is of a threshold nature; that is, the relative degrees of presence of the independent variable are not theoretically essential. 10 Another limitation in QCA is the inability to examine the proportional relationship between variables. Statements such as "a 1-unit increase in x is associated with a .3-unit increase in y" cannot be arrived at via Boolean analysis. Furthermore, though conventional statistical analysis follows a probabilistic logic in identifying proportional relationships, QCA employs a deterministic causal approach. In other words, QCA posits that under certain conditions the dependent variable will occur. However, it is possible that a given contextual configuration can be 692 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 8. Regarding linear probability, logit, and probit techniques, John Aldrich and Forest D. Nelson (1984: 81) suggest that one muster around fifty cases per predictor. Discussing logit modeling, Alfred Demaris (1992: 78) calls for approximately fifteen cases per predictor. Even using this less stringent standard, there are not nearly enough advanced industrial democracies to justify using these techniques.
9. For a more complete treatment of Boolean analysis the classic treatment is Ragin 1987. For a shorter treatment that includes an annotated bibliography of works of theory and application, see Ragin 1994 . See Appendix A for a brief description of this research strategy.
10. One can examine the effect of degrees of presence in Boolean analysis by expressing the continuous variable as two or more dichotomous variables corresponding to different levels of the independent variable. This approach clearly still implies the loss of data, but it can be useful in studies (with a relatively high N) in which the dependent variable and many of the independent variables are dichotomous.
empirically associated with both the presence of NHI and the absence of NHI.
Put differently, real life can produce contradictory outcomes on the dependent variable. QCA provides several different possible approaches for dealing with such situations (Ragin 1987: 113 -118) . One could code any configuration in which NHI is present in a majority of the cases as having NHI present (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992) . Ragin, Mayer, and Drass (1984) provide a variation on this threshold approach to dealing with contradictory outcomes. Other options for dealing with such situations in QCA include coding all contradictory cases as absent and adding new independent variables that would resolve the contradictions. In our study, we will code all contradictory outcomes as indicating the presence of NHI because we are interested in causal scenarios that make NHI feasible. That said, it is useful to interpret all positive configurations (even those without contradictions) as situations in which NHI is feasible (rather than a certainty). This approach is more in keeping with the logic of QCA than the alternative approaches that attempt to set a likelihood threshold for the dependent variable that is more difficult to interpret substantively. The analysis was conducted using the QCA software developed by Kriss Drass (version 3.1).
Variable Specification
We examine the dynamics of national health insurance in twenty advanced industrial democracies in the years 1945 -1994. The Boolean approach models NHI feasibility as a function of five independent variables represented jointly in the following expression:
where H is a national health insurance policy; S is a society with a cultural tradition amenable to government activity in this area; U is a unitary governmental system; E is a dominant executive; L is a leftist party capable of holding the post of chief executive; and C is a corporatist form of interest group politics. In QCA notation, an uppercase letter normally denotes the presence of each variable while a lowercase letter denotes its absence. In turn, Boolean multiplier terms link the variables in an "AND" relationship while Boolean addition expresses an "OR" statement. A purely hypothetical example will help to make this clear: H = SU + e would mean that NHI occurred in all countries with favorable cultural conditions combined with a unitary system of government (regardless of the value of other independent variables) OR where executive-legislative relations were not dominated by the executive (regardless of the value of the other independent variables).
These variables have been operationalized in the following manner. The dependent variable, national health insurance (H), is any national system that offers comprehensive coverage to all residents based on international data from the Social Security Administration (SSA 1997). A culture favorable to government activity in this sphere (S) is defined by coding all countries that are not Anglo-American as having comparatively favorable cultural conditions. A unitary state (U) is defined based on the 1 to 5 scale of federalism and decentralization found in Lijphart (1999: 189) . All countries with a score below 3 were deemed unitary states; all federal states and all semifederal states were not coded as unitary. 11 Similarly, a party government form of executive-legislative relations (E) is defined based on Arend Lijphart's 1 to 5+ scale of executive dominance (ibid.: 132 -133). Countries exhibiting a pattern of executive dominance are those with a score above 3 on Lijphart's index. 12 The presence of an electorally relevant labor party (L) has been defined by at least one leftist party with labor ties serving as the chief executive during two different, noncontinuous terms in the postwar era using the same eighteen leftist parties examined by Frances Castles (1982: 59) . In the 694 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 11. In that research, Lijphart also presents an even more multidimensional measure of the federal-unitary, decentralization-centralization distinction that supplements the index of federalism and decentralization with additional data on bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and central bank independence. While we concur that these additional dimensions help one to understand the scope of Lijphart's conceptualization of consensual democracy in different spheres of public life, the only additional dimension directly relevant to the adoption of NHI is his 1 to 5 index of bicameralism. If one were to apply the same decision rule we use in dichotomizing federal and unitary states to the average of their federalism and bicameralism scores, no countries would be reclassified: all would remain coded as they are based on federalism alone.
12. Lijphart also presents a more multidimensional measure of what he terms the executiveparties dimension that supplements his index of executive dominance (based on cabinet duration for parliamentary systems and based on Lijphart's judgments about the role of the executive in the semipresidential and presidential systems) with additional data on the number of parties in the legislature, the percentage of one-party cabinets, an index of disproportionality for the electoral system, and an index of interest group pluralism. Lijphart employs these additional dimensions to explore another type of distinction among consensual and majoritarian democracies. However, we believe that the application of that multidimensional index would create a party government measure of questionable validity. For example, on the executive-party dimension score, the United States (because of its disproportional electoral system, limited number of parties, and frequent one-party cabinets) is scored as the fifth most executive-centered among the twenty advanced industrial democracies in our study. We believe that although the number of parties and the frequency of one-party cabinets (aided by majoritarian electoral systems) are central to interpreting executive dominance in a parliamentary system, they are of less utility in examining the role of the executive in presidential systems. As a result, we have chosen not to employ Lijphart's broader measure in this study.
other two countries under examination here, the following parties have been categorized as leftist: Iceland (Social Democratic) and Luxembourg (Socialist Workers). 13 The nature of interest group activity as corporatist (C) or pluralist (c) has been measured using Alan Siaroff's (1999: 198) 1 to 5 multidimensional scale of "integration"-which was used by Lijphart (1999) in its preliminary form. All countries with an average score above 3 for the years 1963 -1995 covered by the data are deemed to have corporatist interest group patterns; all other countries are coded as pluralist.
As we mentioned earlier, we recognize that this study employs a crosssectional, "snapshot" approach to a long period of time -fifty years. These five measures are strikingly robust to an examination of the five decades that constitute the period as a whole. The cultural measure is inherently constant over time for all countries. The coding of the unitaryfederal variable would not change for any of the countries if we used Lijphart's scores for 1945 -1970 or for 1971 -1996 . On the executive dominance scale, we do see a difference in the years up to and after 1970 in four countries. In the years 1971 -1996, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden would no longer be characterized as executive dominant, but Germany would be. We have chosen to stand by the data for the larger period 1945 -1996 because that first quarter century was central to the adoption of NHI in those countries. As for party politics, all of the countries that selected labor party chief executives did so on multiple occasions sprinkled throughout the fifty years under analysis. Furthermore, although Germany and the United Kingdom each selected non-labor-party prime ministers during the last fifteen years of the period, labor parties remained an active part of the debate and regained the chief executive post shortly after 1996. Finally, the interest group scores are quite stable across the four decades coded by Siaroff; only Australia moves from a pluralist position during the 1960s and 1970s to a borderline corporatist position during the 1980s and 1990s. All other countries remain pluralist or corporatist throughout each of the four decades. 14 13. Data on cabinet membership for the years 1945 -1980 are taken from Lane, McKay, and Newton's OECD Political Handbook (1991) . Data for the years 1981 -1994 are taken from Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
14. For a complete listing of the coding decisions on each variable regarding each country analyzed, see Table 1 .
Analysis of Results
In Table 1 the first column on the left presents all configurations of the independent variables under examination. The second column lists the number of cases in which national health insurance has not emerged. The third column lists the number of cases in which national health insurance has emerged. The fourth column lists the countries that fit each causal configuration in the table.
In what sorts of countries did national health insurance (NHI) exist in the postwar era? The interactive causal configurations under which NHI existed are captured by the following (Boolean equation 1):
National health insurance emerged and/or endured in three basic scenarios. First, given a receptive societal culture, a relevant leftist party, and a corporatist pattern of interest group activity, NHI existed regardless of the nature of the major political institutions. Second, unitary states with receptive cultures were capable of producing NHI in countries with weaker executives and in countries without a relevant labor party (irrespective of the nature of the other two independent variables). Third, Anglo-American societies with pluralist interest group environments adopted NHI with a dominant executive (regardless of the federal-unitary distinction or the relevance of labor parties).
These Boolean results confirm the relevance of all five of the major factors discussed in the literature. There are scenarios in which each one is an enabling condition associated with the emergence and/or permanence of national health insurance policies. From this comparative view, governmental institutions appear to frame the feasibility of NHI in a fairly powerful manner. With unfavorable values on the two institutional variables, to date, only countries with a combination of jointly favorable cultural, partisan, and interest group conditions have developed and maintained NHI. In that scenario, they have done so under a variety of institutional conditions. In Austria, NHI exists in a federal state (albeit with a dominant executive). Denmark and Finland have NHI without a dominant executive (albeit with unitary states). Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have NHI despite the combination of a federal state and a weak executive. Switzerland has a similar causal configuration-favorable in the extragovernmental conditions -yet failed to adopt NHI. Immergut's analysis suggests that the institutional setting was even less favorable than these measures could capture due to the frequent use of the referendum. Indeed, two specific plans for NHI were rejected by referendum in 1974 (Immergut 1992: 174 -175) .
In each of the other two scenarios, one of the favorable governmental institutions has been associated with the development of NHI. Several continental European countries and Japan developed NHI when the only favorable conditions they shared were a unitary state and a more receptive cultural tradition. A series of Anglo-American countries with pluralist interest group dynamics (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) have developed NHI when the only favorable condition they share on the other three independent variables is a dominant executive. Australia and Canada have federal systems, and the others are unitary states. Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have had powerful leftist parties, but Canada and Ireland have not. Yet, all managed to develop NHI (although it is worth noting that Australia, Canada, and Ireland were among the last of these eighteen countries to adopt NHI).
Considering all three causal scenarios, a formulation of the veto points thesis uniting the federalism, weak executive, and pluralism obstacles Note: In the configurations, an uppercase letter indicates the presence of an independent variable; a lowercase letter, its absence, where: S = societal culture amenable to the emergence of NHI; U = unitary state; E = executive dominance of policy making; L = leftist party capable of capturing the office of chief executive; and C = a corporatist interest-group setting.
gains heightened support in this cross-national analysis. None of the advanced industrial democracies that have adopted NHI have done so in the face of all three of these obstacles. To date, the absence of favorable governmental conditions has only been overcome by the simultaneous presence of all three other supporting factors (culture, labor party relevance, and corporatism). Furthermore, consideration of the other case without NHI (Switzerland) also points to additional institutional veto points (e.g., the referendum) not modeled in this cross-national analysis.
The United States is the only country that has an unfavorable value on all five independent variables. Of the twenty advanced industrial democracies under examination, two have favorable conditions on all five variables. Four other countries have favorable conditions on at least four of the five factors. Nine countries have three favorable factors; all but Switzerland have NHI. That leaves only five with a more challenging environment for the development of NHI; four adopted NHI while the United States did not. Of those four with national health insurance, only Canada faced four obstacles -with only its parliamentary executive deemed advantageous among the five independent variables under consideration here. It is instructive that the four adopters amid these unfavorable circumstances (Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Italy) were among the last of these advanced industrial democracies to enact NHI.
This comparative view summarized in Table 1 gives us a richer perspective on the challenges faced by advocates of NHI in the United States than what can be gleaned by national case studies alone. In studies of the United States alone, the debate has focused on weighing the relative importance of each of the five factors. Cultural studies emphasize the individualistic nature of the U.S. society while critics attempt to muster public opinion data on health care to demonstrate that citizens support action in this area. Studies of parties and interest groups focus on the specific strategies of the two major parties and the most visible interest groups engaged in the health care debate. Institutionalist arguments attempt to highlight how the many decision points embedded a presidential polity in a federal state make sweeping reform difficult. All of these case studies have deepened our understanding of the role of each of these factors in particular situations in the history of the health policy debate in the United States.
However, these arguments about the relative importance of the factors miss the mark once one tries to take in the experiences of the other advanced industrial democracies. Countries with individualistic heritages have adopted NHI; countries with federal states have done so. Countries without parliamentary executives have developed NHI and countries without important leftist parties have adopted NHI, as have countries with pluralist interest group patterns. None of these factors poses an insurmountable obstacle for the adoption of NHI.
Instead, Table 1 makes it clear that two things set the United States apart from other advanced industrial democracies on the issue of national health insurance. First, the United States and Switzerland are the only such countries without NHI. Second, the United States is the only country where all five of these obstacles to NHI exist side by side.
These QCA results summarize the experiences of these twenty countries. It is crucial to note that Boolean equation 1 does not encompass all conceivable situations but, instead, all situations that have actually occurred. Fourteen causal configurations of these five independent variables exist among these twenty countries; an additional eighteen configurations logically exist, but no advanced industrial democracies fit those profiles. It is an open question whether these situations are capable of fostering NHI in advanced industrial democracies since there are no empirical successes or failures to study.
Implications
We began this analysis by noting that both broad cross-national research and case studies can improve our understanding of the dynamics of the adoption of NHI. One of the contributions of cross-national research is the ability to subject propositions examined in a few cases to a larger empirical test in more diverse settings. In this study of advanced industrial democracies, our results add considerable empirical support to the veto points hypothesis developed in the analysis of just three countriesFrance, Sweden, and Switzerland. Countries with neither unitary states nor dominant executives adopted NHI only when the other three extragovernmental factors were all favorable for adoption.
Our comparative approach also enriches the case study debate within the United States. From a broader comparative viewpoint, the most distinctive element underlying U.S. exceptionalism in health policy is the simultaneous presence of unfavorable conditions on all five factors. Alert readers will recall at this point that the Boolean approach has not permitted the analysis of any country's relative position on any of the five independent variables -all have been dichotomized. The limitation of this approach means that the importance of countries' relative position on these causal influences remains an open question. Unfortunately, as we noted in our methodological discussion, traditional quantitative approaches to examining proportional relationships are unusable in this instance because of the small-N problem.
That said, it is worth noting that the United States would prove just as distinctive on each of these five independent variables if one were able to examine these hypotheses using continuous measures. In contemporary public opinion data, the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 1999) provides evidence that the United States has the most individualistic advanced industrial society among those examined in that project. The United States is at the top of the 1 to 5 scale of federalism and decentralization found in Lijphart (1999: 189) and at the bottom of Lijphart's 1 to 5+ scale of executive dominance (ibid.: 132 -133) . Not only does the United States not have a labor party capable of capturing the office of chief executive, it has not had a leftist party capable of capturing more than a rare seat in Congress. Finally, on Siaroff's (1999) continuum of pluralism to integration (i.e., corporatism), only Canada is (slightly) more pluralist than the United States from the 1960s to the presentwith only the United Kingdom remotely close to either North American country in its degree of pluralism. In summary, if one were able to conduct a more traditional, probabilistic examination of proportional relationships, the United States would have been not just the only country with unfavorable conditions on all five variables but also the country with the most unfavorable condition on four factors and the second most unfavorable condition on the fifth variable.
How might a set of proportional hypotheses be examined cross-nationally? One could study every year in which an expansion (or reduction) of the population covered by national health insurance legislation is considered by governments. Since we have yet to pursue this option, we are uncertain whether this would generate enough cases to consider pursuing a quantitative analysis. Even if sufficient cases could be identified through this approach, we are somewhat skeptical about its success as a path to quantitative analysis because there are additional obstacles beyond the small-N problem. One such obstacle lies in the slow-tochange nature of these structural independent variables. In a pooled data set, serial correlation among the independent variables within a case would pose a significant challenge -particularly if the dependent variable remains dichotomous (which would be the prima facie operationalization of any legislative decision).
If quantitative analysis remains elusive, how might comparative case studies explore the importance of a country's relative position on each of these independent variables? Consider, for example, how comparative case studies could be framed to examine importance of a country's relative position on the veto points concept that received considerable confirmation in our study. One could employ a variant of the most-different-systems and most-similar-systems approaches outlined by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970) . At an initial stage, researchers could base case selection on similar values on other major factors other than the veto points issue. Then one could look at the relationship between NHI adoption and the number of veto points found in the political system. That most-similar study would presumably look in great detail at a small number of cases aimed at explicating the theoretical justification for believing that any observed correlation between veto points and the fate of NHI was not merely coincidental. After conducting such a study, one could then envision looking at all available cases using a most-different systems analysis in which cohorts of countries without commonalties on other variables could be grouped according to their relative number of veto points.
The above discussion is decidedly speculative because, to date, there has been no systematic attempt to measure the veto points present in all of the advanced industrial democracies at one or more periods of time. Given the support for the veto points hypothesis in our results and its relevance for explaining the Swiss failure to adopt when other roughly similar countries enacted NHI, we call for future research to operationalize this multidimensional concept more systematically. 15 In our study, we have tracked three dimensions along which veto points could be arranged: the degree to which government authority is centralized, the degree of executive dominance (in theory and in practice) of the legislature, and the degree to which interest group activity is corporatist. In our study, because of the approach employed, each of those dimensions was treated as a separate variable measured in dichotomous form.
However, if the veto points hypothesis is to be examined directly, rules must be developed for more systematically measuring the degree to which they are present in a political system. The creation of a more systematic veto points measure would have implications not only for research on comparative health policy but for the study of policy making on any issue. If we had a firmer sense of the empirical spread of veto 15. Tsebelis (1995) evaluates political systems' capacity to produce policy change by conceptualizing a "veto players" framework. For some initial attempts to operationalize the veto points concept, see Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Crepaz 1998; Haverland 2000; Immergut 1990 Immergut , 1992 and Tsebelis 1999. points, case studies utilizing the concept could be enriched just as much as variable-oriented studies.
So far, we have focused our conclusion on the scholarly implications of our research. From a policy-oriented perspective, the worst-case implications suggested by this cross-national study of health politics have no doubt been disheartening to would-be reformers. The United States' unique position of having a strikingly negative context for the adoption of NHI on all five of these variables is cause for concern if one desires NHI. However, although these results help us to understand why the United States has failed to adopt NHI, it should be noted that we have refused to present these results under a deterministic logic; instead, we have insisted on noting that these Boolean results map when NHI has been observed as feasible. It may be possible for political entrepreneurs to overcome these five obstacles -by changing one or more of these conditions or, perhaps, by employing a skillful political strategy that overcomes the obstacles.
The cross-national trends summarized in Equation 1 leave advocates of NHI in the United States with two options. First, they could base their strategic decision on the empirical record alone (i.e., equation 1) and push for a parliamentary executive. In that empirical record, there is one such example of NHI emerging in a Anglo-American country with a federal state, no electorally relevant leftist party, and a parliamentary government -Canada. Binational comparisons have already demonstrated that Canada and the United States followed similar paths until the 1950s when a move to hospitalization insurance in Canada set into motion a chain of events that culminated in the adoption of a single-payer plan for NHI in the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g., Kudrle and Marmor 1981) . Was the existence of a parliamentary executive the key to the adoption to NHI? From our broader examination of this causal model, it was what set Canada most clearly apart from the United States. However, before NHI advocates launch headlong into calls for the adoption of a parliamentary system, they would do well to consider the possibility that the obstacles to reform on that issue may be even steeper than those confronting the adoption of NHI. Weaver and Rockman (1993b) provide a useful summary of the state of affairs on that score:
The prospects for major institutional reforms in the United States are not promising. If major institutional reform is most likely when there is either a massive, visible institutional failure or when the rules for institutional change are quite permissive, then the prospects in the United States are dim, because neither condition exists. Whatever the problems facing the country, they seem less than a massive crisis of governance. Further, the rules on constitutional revision are perhaps the toughest of any democratic country. (472) Nothing that occurred in the remainder of the 1990s would seem to have changed this assessment in a way that improves the prospects for major reform of governmental institutions.
In light of these obstacles, NHI advocates might be moved to consider another approach. As noted earlier, some recent studies demonstrate a shift in public opinion toward more support for health care reform in general (e.g., Peterson 1993a; Schlesinger and Lee 1993) . Advocates of NHI need to find a way to bridge the gap between a desire for reform and a commitment to NHI itself. As Jacobs (1993b) has argued, public opinion on this (or any other major policy issue) is only likely to be effective in influencing policy formation when it is vocal and unambiguous.
There is clearly work to be done to move public opinion toward more vigorous support of NHI. As Theda Skocpol (1993) has noted, the need for greater public support could have important implications for the choice of which policy model of NHI advocates should promote. More complicated schemes (such as managed competition) have the advantage of offering a mix of private and public responsibilities. On the other hand, these mixed approaches may prove too complex to explain and thus fail to generate the necessary level of public support. Skocpol writes, "Just as the advocates of Social Security during the New Deal were willing to use compelling metaphors and political rhetoric to explain to the citizenry why it made sense to have new levels of governmental involvement in the provision of old-age security, so will today's advocates of health care reform have to be able to explain their proposals to the American people" (ibid.: 73).
Our variable-oriented, cross-national study cannot address directly the question of how to develop and execute a successful strategy for mobilizing political support. Such questions are better left to detailed case studies and to variable-oriented studies of public opinion. Our crossnational findings regarding the obstacles faced by NHI advocates provide a much firmer backdrop of evidence against which to conclude that veto points hurdles and other obstacles faced by any such strategy are likely to be considerable. The other four countries with three or four unfavorable conditions among the five factors studied here were among the last of these countries to adopt NHI. Those countries' success -against considerable odds in several respects -suggests that reform is not necessarily a lost cause. It is, however, certainly a difficult challenge from a crossnational perspective.
Appendix A
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) combines aspects of both caseoriented and variable-oriented research strategies to examine situations involving more than a handful of cases -with the intention being to capture the strengths of both methods: the empirical intensity of the caseoriented approach and the generalizability and wider scope of variableoriented techniques. As Ragin (1987) notes, the Boolean approach "is oriented towards cases because it addresses the different combination of causes relevant to outcomes and allows the investigator to examine cases relative to different causal paths . . . (and to) simultaneously identify key cases and key causal conjunctures" (168-169). At the same time, QCA is variable oriented in that investigators must identify causal variables as the key elements of their analysis. QCA based on Boolean algebra allows us to evaluate a larger numbers of cases and to achieve some generality without forsaking complexity.
In QCA, causal variables are evaluated as basic elements that determine configurations -they are considered in combination, rather than with an eye to determining their unique contribution to any observed variation in a specified outcome. In addition, causal conditions are considered in both their present and absent states. Thus, each case is considered holistically as a configuration of conditions, rather than as a collection of scores on variables as we find in variable-oriented strategies. Qualitative comparative analysis utilizing Boolean logic thus represents each case under study as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. Every possible combination of causal and outcome conditions for each case is considered through a process of bottom-up paired comparisons. The results of these comparisons are then simplified in a data matrix (with the data represented in binary form as 1's and 0's, where 1 means the presence of the outcome or condition and 0 indicates its absence). This data matrix, or "truth table" lists different combinations of causal conditions and the value of the outcome variable for cases conforming to each combination. The truth table is then reviewed to produce a logical equation for the outcome that indicates the different combinations of causal conditions which may produce that specific outcome (Ragin 1994: 308 -312) .
